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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION FOR THE USE
AND BENEFIT OF ANDERSON LUMBER COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 9113
J. LOYD UNDERWOOD,
Defendant
and PHOENIX INSURANCE
COMPANY OF HARTFORD
CONNECTICUT, a Connecticut
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Anderson
Lumber Company in the name of the Davis County
Board of Education against J. Loyd Underwood
and Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut allegedly to recover for materials furnished
the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, for the construction of an addition to the South Davis Junior
1
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High School. The materials were furnished through
what has been designated the Bountiful Yard of
the Anderson Lumber Company, which account has
been paid and is not in question here, and what is
designated the Ogden Yard of 'the Anderson Lumber Company.
No contention is made in this appeal that the
materials were not furnished nor that the defendant
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, as the bonding company for J. Loyd Underwood, is not responsible for the payment of those
materials.
The appellant, Phoenix Insurance Company of
Hartford, Connecticut, hy this appeal seeks to secure a credit for a payment of $7,713.66 which this
appellant claims was wrongfully applied to a ndte
of J. Loyd Underwood with Anderson Lumber Company and which note was given in payment of a
pre-existing indebtedness on the part of J. Loyd
Underwood to the Anderson Lumber Company and
which indebtedness has no connection with the supplying of rna terials or labor to the South Davis
Junior High School. It is the contention of the appellant, Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford,
Connecticut, that by the device of a note and the
manner in which payments were applied to the payment of that note the Anderson Lumber Company
and J. Loyd Underwood have wrongfully and un2
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lawfully defrauded the Davis County Board of Education and the appellant, Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, of the sum of
$7,713.66 by using moneys which should have been
applied to the payment of materials and labor for
other purposes, and that said sum should be allowed
as an off-set against the cost of the materials furnished by the Anderson Lumber Company.
For the purpose of convenience we shall refer
to the pages of the Record, other than the transcript, as "R. ________ ,. We will refer to the pages of
the Transcript as "'Tr. --------"·
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This construction contract involved the sum
of approximately $400,000.00 and was the biggest
job which the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, had
ever undertaken (Tr. 49). He had some difficulty
getting a bond and in that connection it was necessary for him to see various persons, including the
plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, and explain
the situation to them ( Tr. 50) . Mr. George A. Ward,
the manager of the Ogden branch of the Anderson
Lumber Company (Tr. 9), wrote a letter under
date of November 2, 1955 directed to whom it may
concern but intended for Mr. Charles Eubank, the
insurance agent who wrote this bond on behalf of
the defendant, Phoenix Insurance Company (Tr.
13, 117). By that letter, which has been introduced
3
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as Defendant's Exhibit 1 herein, he represented
that J. Loyd Underwood had been a customer of
Anderson Lumber Company for the last six years
and that he had had credit with the Anderson
Lumber Company recently as high as $15,000.00.
He further reported that should Mr. Underwood
need an extension of credit in connection with this
job the Anderson Lumber Company was prepared to
carry his accounts for material and millwork until
such time as advances could be made to him on
his contract.
'The Anderson Lumber Company was interested
in securing the millwork phase of the contract and
in that connection Mr. Ward prepared bids on the
millwork which were submitted to all the bidders
who were bidding on the school, including J. Loyd
Underwood (Tr. 10). The plain'tiff, Anderson Lumber Company, was successful and subsequently furnished the millwork in connection with the project
(Tr. 32), which is included in the claim made by
the Anderson Lumber Company against the defendant, Phoenix Insurance Company, in this case (Defendant's Exhibit 2). In this connection Mr. Ward
admits checking the specifications the architect had
prepared for the building ('Tr. 14) and reading
through those specifications ('Tr. 16, 51). The specifications carried a completion date for the entire
project of September 2, 1956.
4
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J. Loyd Underwood submitted a Contractor's
Financial Statement to The Phoenix Insurance Company as of the close of business on October 31, 1955
(Tr. 54) which has been introduced herein as Defendant's Exhibit 4. At that time Mr. Underwood
owed, according to his Financial Statement, the
sum of $7,000.00 to the Anderson Lumber Company for materials which had been furnished (Exhibit 4) presumably prior to that date. These materials were all carried in an open account (Tr.
55).
Mr. Underwood was a't that time completing two
other jobs, one at the Clearfield Community Church
and the other a small retaining wall at Washington
Terrace. He continued to purchase materials for
these jobs. He apparently completed the Washington
Terrace jdb prior to May 10, 1956 as it is not shown
as being uncompleted on a Financial Statement he
furnished as of May 10, 1956. The Clearfield Church
job was substantially completed as of May 10, 1956
(Exhibit 5, Tr. 59). The materials purchased for
these jobs were charged to an open account ( Tr.
53, 17), which was the only account which J. Loyd
Underwood had with the Ogden branch of the Anderson Lumber Company up to May 10, 1956. By
May of 1956 there was approximately $11,000.00
owing the plain tiff by J. Loyd Underwood in this
account, the exact amount as shown by an examina5
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tion of Anderson Lumber Company's books being
$11,485.20 (Tr. 33, Defendant's Exhibit 3).
Between October 31, 1955 and May 10, 1956
Mr. Underwood drew a total of $70,517.08 from
the Davis County School Board and on May 10,
1956 Mr. Underwood paid the Anderson Lumber
Company the sum of $11,790.51 made up of two
payments, one of $4,500.00 and one of $7,290.51
('Tr. 18), leaving Mr. Underwood with a credit
balance of $305.31 in the open account (Tr. 48,
101). On page 62 of the transcript Mr. Underwood
testified tha:t he could not have paid this payment
of approximately $11,000.00 on the open account if
the Anderson Lumber Company had not agreed at
that time tha:t he might borrow $7,300.00 of the
sum back again, even though he had $59,000.00 in
the bank and owed $35,150.00, leaving a balance of
cash on hand of about $23,000.00 to $24,000.00
( Tr. 61). The Anderson Lumber Company had,
however, agreed through Mr. Ward a day or two
prior to this payment to loan the money to Mr.
Underwood (Tr. 73, 74).
Accordingly, Mr. Underwood came into the Anderson Lumber Company on May 12, 1956, picked
up a check for $7,300.00 and signed an interest
bearing aemand note (Tr. 113-114). Although the
Anderson Lumber Company claimed to have supplied materials to the contractor, J. Loyd Under6
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wood, for the South Davis Junior High School in
the fall of 1955 and spring of 1956 (Tr. 25), no
specific account had been set up to identify materials furnished the contractor for the Davis County
job (Tr. 115) and no materials could be specifically
identified as having been furnished to the contractor for that job (T1·. 40). As of May 10, 1956 a new
account was opened in the general office of the
company by Darrold Crawford, secretary and treasurer of the company, for the first time identifying
materials furnished from the Ogden yard tD J.
Loyd Underwood for the construction of the addition to the South Davis Junior High School (Tr. 95,
93). This was done on directio_p.s from Mr. Ward
who, if he was following the usual practice followed
by the company, was acting pursuant to an agreement between him and Mr. Underwood (Tr. 97).
Both Mr. Ward, the yard manager, and Mr. Crawford, the secretary and treasurer of the company,
knew tha:t the Davis County School job, being a
public building, was covered by a bond ('Tr. 22,
108) . The first en try in this account was a charge
for the alleged loan of $7,300.00 (Tr. 95, Exhibit
2). The second entry was a service charge on this
loan of two percent or $146.00 (Exhibit 2) which
Mr. Ward testified J. Loyd Underwood had agreed
to pay (Tr. 31). On the other hand, Mr. Underwood
testified that he did not know he was being charged
a service charge.
7
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On September 15, 1956 Mr. Underwood made
two payments, one for $1,000.00 and one for
$3,000.00 ('Tr. 44). The $1,000.00 payment was
applied to the account opened for the charges from
the Bountiful yard; $827.81 of the $3,000.00 payment was applied on an open account and the remaining $2,172.19 was applied against the account
opened by the Ogden yard for the South Davis
Junior High School ( Tr. 44-45). Except as it was
applied to the same account that the note and service charge had been charged to, no part of these
two payments was applied directly to the payment
of the note or the service charge.
The addition to the South Davis Junior High
School was not completed on September 2, 1956 as
provided in the contract (Tr. 51-52) and the last
of the millwork was not delivered by the Anderson
Lumber Company until around December 17, 1956
(Tr. 15). By January of 19'57 Charles Eubank, the
insurance agent of Phoenix Insurance Company in
this case CTr. 117), began receiving telephone calls
from creditors of Mr. Underwood who "felt that
things were not going properly" (Tr. 118-120) and
on about the 1st of February, 1957 he went to Mr.
Underwood concerning the reports that he had been
receiving (Tr. 119-120). By that time Mr. Underwood was in the hole, not including whatever might
be owed to Anderson Lumber Company in this case,
8
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to the extent of some $48,000.00 ( Tr. 86).
On February 4, 1957 J. Loyd Underwood made
a payment to the Anderson Lumber Company of
$10,000.00 by check (Plaintiff's Exhibit B, Tr. 11).
By this time Mr. Underwood had drawn all but
$7,500.00 of the money due him under the contract
with Davis County Board of Education ( Tr. 72).
Although no demand for payment of the note
had ever been made (Tr. 22, 105) and Mr. Underwood had never previously designated where the
moneys which he paid should be applied, Mr. Underwood claims that he designated that this $10,000.00
be applied first to the payment of the note of
$7,300.00 ('Tr. 67, 68, 69). He claims tha;t he did
this because he wanted to get rid of the interest
(Tr. 69) even though it is admitted 'that he was
paying interest on the account (Tr. 30). In this
connection it is interesting to note that Mr. Ward
testified that it was his "own individual reasoning
... to pay that note off and stop the interest on it
for him, and get it out of the way" ( Tr. 24) .
Mr. Underwood produced what purports to be
his copy of the check for $10,000.00 to which there
is attached a voucher with the words "please pay
note and apply balance to account" (Tr. 66, Defendant's Exhibit 6). An examination of Defendant's Exhibit 6 shows that the writing on the
voucher is different than the writing on the check,
9
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indicating that it was written by two different persons or at least at different times. Mr. Underwood's
explanation is that he "made the check out and then
laid my pen down and reached and picked up a
pencil and wrote that on the top" ( Tr. 128, 129).
Mr. Ward did not know whether this voucher was
attached to the check at the time he received it or
not ( Tr. 133, 134). At any rate the Anderson Lumber Company was unable to find their copy of the
voucher (Tr. 136) even though their practice is to
retain vouchers where they have accounts with companies which are doing business with a number of
yards (Tr. 137) and it is admitted that Mr. Underwood was doing business with both the Ogden and
the Bountiful yard (Tr. 137).
Other than to deny the claims of the defendant
Phoenix Insurance Con1pany, pl'aintiff's defense to
those claims was based on three theories, evidence
on which was objected to by the defendant as having no bearing on the lawsuit but on which the court
allowed evidence to be introduced. These theories
were : ( 1) tha:t the prior existing indebtedness which
was pa'id by the loan was made up in part of charges
against the addition to the South Davis Junior High
School; (2) that the defendant Phoenix Insurance
Company of Hartford, Connecticut may have carried 'the bond on one of the two other jobs 'being done
by J. Loyd Underwood and that it would have had
10
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to pay the pre-existing indebtedness anyway; and
(3) that the $7300.00 loan was used to pay labor
and other costs which were incurred by J. Loyd
Underwood in the construction of the addition to
the South Davis Junior High School.
Beginning on page 75 of the Transcript the
following questions were asked 'by the attorney for
the plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, and the
following answers were given by Mr. Underwood:
"Q. Now I believe you also told us in
your direct examination during the period
from November, 1955 to May of 1956, that
you had two other construction jobs that were
going?
"A. I had two or four small construction jobs.
"Q. But at least two?
''A. Yes, at least two.
"Q. And I believe it was also your testimony that you had purchased and had charged to your open account with Anderson Lumber Company materials that were going into
those two other jobs?
"A. Well, the open account, just everything that I purchased went into it.
"Q. And in addition, there were i terns
that were going into the South Davis High
School jdb. Is that right?
"MR. HANSON: We object to that on the
ground that it has already been settled by pretrial issue. They are 'bound by their proof
and the only proof they have made is it was
charged after May 10, 1956.
11
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"Q. Mr. Hanson, that is what I tried to
get you to limit your testimony to this morning, but you wouldn't do it.
"THE COURT: You may answer this
question.
"Q. Well, I asked you, Mr. Underwood,
if the open account that you had with Anderson Lumber Company during the period of
November, 1955 to May of 1956 included materials that you had purchased for the South
Davis High School job?
"A. It had.
"Q. And also these two other jobs that
you had going during that period of time?
"A. Yes."
Continuing on page 76 of the Transcript and
relating to the proposition of whether or not the
defendant Phoenix Insurance Company carried
other construction bonds on some other job for J.
Loyd Underwood, plaintiff's counsel asked the following questions and Mr. Underwood gave the following answers:
"Q. Now drawing your attention specifically to those two other jobs, I believe you
also mentioned to us that they were bonded
jobs.
''A. Two of them were, yes.
"Q. And could you tell this jury with
what bonding company those bonds were
placed?
"A. ·They were placed with the same
12
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agent, I don't know, I don't recall offhand, if
it was the same company.
''Q. Would it be your opinion that it
would be the same company?
"A. It would.
"MR. HANSON: We object to any opinion he may have.
"THE COURT: You may answer if you
know who the bonding company is.
''A. Of my own knowledge, I would
have to check my records to see.
"Q. What is your best recollection?
"A. My best recollection is that they
were.
"Q. With Phoenix Insurance Co.?
''A. Yes.
"Q. The defendant here?
''A. Yes.
"Q. And in any event, they were placed
with the same agent for Phoenix Insurance
Co.?
"A. Yes.
"Q. So that if the $11,000.00 which you
paid in May of '56 was not a ppl'ied to materials on the open account that you had purchased for these two other jobs, in addition
to the materials supplied the South Davis
High School, Phoenix would have to have discharged that obligation anyway, would they
not?
"MR. HANSON: We object to that, Your
13
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Honor. It goes beyond the issues of this case.
We are concerned here only with the one account and that is the account of the South
Davis Junior High School. We don't have any
evidence of the fact that Phoenix Insurance
Co. had these other jobs.
"THE COURT: It goes to the issue of
what his motivation may have been. You may
go into it for that purpose.
"Q. I don't understand the court's ruling on motivation only.
"THE COURT: It goes to why he did
this, why he might have made his payment the
way he did. What direction he may have
given.
"Q. Perhaps we ought to argue this
without the jury being present, one of the
positions is that we have conspired to reroute
monies that should have been applied-.
"THE COURT: (Interposing) It goes
to that issue.
"Q. It goes to that issue specifically
and that is why the query was made.
"THE COURT: It goes to that issue.
"Q. Mr. Underwood, if the $11,000.00
paid in May of 1956 had 'been applied to other
than this open account, - .
"A. (Interposing) There wasn't any
other.
"Q. Well, supposing you had retained
the $7300.00 instead of making the loan with
Anaerson Lumber C o m p any and that
$7300.00, $7290.00 had not been applied to
14
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the open account and had never been paid, now
wouldn't it be a fact that that amount would
be covered a bond with the named insurance
company?
''A. That I don't know.
"MR. HANSON: We object to that.
"THE COUR'T: The answer that he does
not know may remain.
"Q. Well, these other two jobs were covered by a bond with Phoenix Insurance Co.,
to your best recollection?
"A. Yes, I was doing some that was
and some that wasn't so that would have to
be looked into.''
In regard to the third theory, that is, that the
money had been used on the addition to the South
Davis Junior High School anyway, plaintiff's counsel asked and Mr. Underwood answered as follows
on page 74 of the Transcri p't:
"Q. Did you inform Mr. Ward here the
purpose for which you were borrowing that
money?
''A. Yes.
"Q. And what did you tell him?
"A. Working capital for the job that I
had with the School.
"Q. The South Davis High School job?
''A. Yes.
"Q. And did you propose to use that
money to pay the labor and materialmen?
15
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"A. Anything that came up.
"Q. On the South Davis School job?
"A. Yes."
Within ten days of the time Mr. Underwood
had made this last payment to Anderson Lumber
Company he notified the bonding company that he
was going to have to turn the matter over to them
(Tr. 66). At that time he had about $20,000.00 in
'the bank which was disbursed to the various creditors under the direction of the bonding company
(Tr. 80). After disbursement of this $20,000.00
and not including the amount owed the Anderson
Lumber Company, he owed a!bout $48,000.00 (Tr.
86). all of which has been paid (Tr. 87, 88).
The foregoing constitutes all of the evidence
which the appellant herein considers pertinent to
the questions before the court on this appeal.
Part of our argument will be directed to the
errors of the court in instructing the jury and the
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in arguing the case
to the jury, but it is felt that those matters may
best be set out in that part of the argument to
which they apply.
In our Statement of Points filed herein we have
set out nine items (R. 91) which may be consolidated into 'the following Statement of Points for
purposes of this appeal.
16
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
THE JURY TO ALLOW DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT A SET-OFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,713.66 AND
IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIS DEFENDAN'T FOR
$11,320.16.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE
IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND ARE BEYOND THE ISSUES DETERMINED BY THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
POIN'T III.
THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY OR ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY AND 'THE SPECIAL VERDICT SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WAS SO RESTRICTIVE AS
TO NOT ADEQUATELY COVER THE ISSUES IN THE
CASE.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND SET
OUT IN POINTS I 'THROUGH III, AND UPON THE
FURTHER GROUND THAT 'THE COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL,
IRRELEVANT AND OUTSIDE THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AND PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS GUILTY OF
MISCONDUCT IN ARGUING 'THIS EVIDENCE IN THE
CLOSING ARGUMENT.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY AND AGAINST J. LOYD UNDERWOOD IN THE
AMOUNT OF $12,083.57.
17
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
THE JURY TO ALLOW DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT A SET-OFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,713.66 AND
IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT FOR
$11,320.16.

It is the contention of the defendant Phoenix
Insurance Company that it should have been allowed
a set-off in the amount of $7,713.66 against the
judgment of $11,320.16 for the reason that the
$7,713.66 should have been applied by the Anderson
Lumber Company toward the payment of materials
furnished the Davis County Board of Education
through the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, and
not to the loan or note which the Anderson Lumber
Company held. There is no question but that the
defendant J. Loyd Underwood was dbligated under
his contract with the Davis County Board of Education to pay for all labor and materials furnished
or used in the construction of the addition to the
South Davis Junior High School. By its bond herein
the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut undertook to assure the Davis County Board
of Education that the contractor would pay all persons who would furnish labor or materials. This
defendant, therefore, stands in the shoes of the
Davis County Board of Education insofar as pay18
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ment for labor and materials used in the construction of the addition is concerned, and by the same
token has the same right to have the moneys paid
under the construction contract applied to the payment of materials and labor that the Davis County
Board of Education had under that con traet.
Where money is paid by one person to another
the general rule applicable to the application of the
payments to different debts is as stated in Section
387 of the Restatement Of The Law, Contracts.
"Where more than one matured contractural duty is owed to the same person and
these duties are for performances of identical
character, such as the payment of money, a
payment or other performance capable of discharging in whole or in part either one or
another of these duties, is applied, subject to
the rules stated in§§ 388-393,
" (a) as the debtor, at or before the time
of payment or performance, manifests to the
creditor an intention to have it applied; or,
"(b) if the debtor makes no such manifestation, as the creditor within a reasonable time manifests an intention to have it
applied; or,
" (c) if neither the de'btor nor creditor
makes a seasonable manifestation of intention, as a just regard to its effect upon the
debtor, the creditor, and third persons makes
it desirable that it should be applied."
However, if the person paying the money is
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under a duty to a third person to devote the money
paid by him to the discharge of a particular debt,
the rule is as set out in Section 388 of the Restatement Of The Law, Contracts.
"If the payor is under a duty to a third
person to devote money paid by him to the
discharge of a particular debt the payment
must be so applied if the creditor knows, or
has reason to know, of the payor's duty, in
spite of the fact that the payor directs that
the payment shall be applied to the discharge
of another debt."
Cases annotated in 41 A.L.R. 1297 and supplemented in 130 A.L.R. 198 and 166 A.L.R. 641 announce a somewhat broader rule, stated as follows:
"In the following cases it has been held
that where the owner of property pays a creditor, and the latter with the proceeds of that
payment pays a third person who has two or
more claims against the creditor, one of which
may ripen into a lien against the property,
the owner (person making the original payment) may insist that such secondary payment be applied to the lienable claim in exoneration of his property. " 41 A.L.R. 1298.
The reason for this rule is:
"A reason for the rule is stated in Williams v. Willingham-Tijt Lumber Co., (1909)
5 Ga. App. 533, 63 S. E. 584, as follows: The
law will make the credit according to principles of justice and equity, and will not permit the money of one man to be used in the
payment of the debts of another man, or declare a lien on the property of the man who
20
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has paid in full for all the material furnished
to improve his property, and release from a
lien the property of the man who still owes
for the material that was used to improve
his property." 41 A.L.R. 1299.
Utah, however, falls within that group which
requires that the creditor know, or have reason to
know, of the payor's duty before impressing a duty
on the creditor to apply the payment to that particular debt or a debt which may ripen into a lien
against the owner's property. See Salt Lake City v.
O'Conner, 249 Pac. 810, 68 Utah 233 and Utah State
Building Comm. v. Great American Insurance Company, 140 Pac. (2d) 763, 105 Utah 11.
A promise to the third person to apply payments to a particular debt where the creditor knows
of such duty raises the obligation that the payment
be applied to tha:t particular debt.
"Although the right of the debtor or
creditor to appropriate to any debt will not
be affected by a promise to a third person
made without consideration to appropriate to
a particular debt, where the debtor is under
a duty to a third person to apply a payment
to the discharge of a particular debt, and the
creditor knows of such duty, the payment
must be so applied. It has 'been held that, in
order for this rule to apply, it does not suffice that the debtor is under a duty to the
third person to pay the debt, but he must 'be
under a duty to devote to that debt the very
money with which the payment is made.
21
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Where the debtor procures a loan on the representation that it will be applied to the payment of a particular debt, he is estopped to
apply the payment otherwise and the estoppel
extends to a creditor having knowledge of the
facts; but where the debtor fails to apply the
payment the creditor is free to apply the payment to any debt where he is ignorant of the
third person's rights. Where neither the d~b
tor nor the creditor applies a payment, it has
been held that the court will apply it to a
rna tured debt which the debtor is under a
duty to a third person to pay immediately
rather than to one where he is under no such
duty." 70 C.J.S. 282.
The claim that the money which was loaned
to the contractor was used to pay for labor and material need not concern us in the consideration of
this point. This court has held in Salt Lake City
v. O'Conner, supra, that the claim of the surety
who has been obliged to pay loans for material and
labor is superior to that of the person who loans
money to the contractor, even assuming that the
money loaned was loaned to enable a contractor to
pay for material and tabor furnished under the contract.
The only payment we are concerned with in
this case is that payment in the sum of $10,000 made
on February 4, 1957. We are not concerned with the
application of the payments made on May 10, 1956
or in the intervening period between May 10, 1956
22
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and February 4, 1957 except as they relate to and
show the intent of and the knowledge of the Anderson Lumber Company when it received the payment
of February 4, 1957. The evidence in this case dictates the conclusion that on that date the Anderson
Lumber Company, through its representative Mr.
\Vard, knew the source of the moneys which Mr.
J. Loyd Underwood paid to it and of J. Loyd Underwood's duty to use those moneys for the discharge
of his duty to the Davis County Board of Education
and the bonding company in paying for the materials and supplies furnished for the addition to the
South Davis Junior High School. In fact, the evidence is much stronger than th'i's and shows a course
of dealing between Mr. Ward and Mr. Underwood
calculated to enable the Anderson Lumber Company
to l'ecover both its loan and the cost of material
and supplies, which arrangement was a fraud upon
the Davis Coun'ty Board of Education and, through
i't, the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford,
Connecticut. This is not a situation, as is quite often
the case, of a contractor and a supplier dealing with
each other at arm's length, where the supplier has
no knowledge of the duties or obligations of the contractor. All of the parts of this transaction which
are rna terial to this case were handled on behalf of
the Anderson Lumber Company by one man, George
A. Ward, manager of 'the Ogden yard. He is the man
23
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who on November 2, 1955 wrote the bonding company that
"Mr. J. Loyd Underwood, General Contractor, who has recently been awarded a contract on the South Davis Jr. High School at
Bountiful for the sum of $398,000.00, has
been a customer of ours for the last six year."
(Exhibit 1)
He is the man who impliedly promised the
bonding company that advances made to Mr. Underwood under the contract would be applied to the
materials and millwork furnished.
". . . Should he need some extension of
credit in connection with this job, we are
prepared to carry his account for materials
and mill work until such time as advances
can be made to him on his contract."
It was he who looked over the contract, prepared a bid on the millwork and submitted the same
to J. Loyd Underwood and, therefore, knew the
details of the entire contemplated construction project.
Of course, Mr. Ward denies that he had any
knowledge of the source of the $10,000 payment
made to him on February 4, 1957 or the duty that
J. Loyd Underwood was under to apply this money
to the con tract of the Davis County School Board,
which might be expected since his admission of that
fact would have terminated this litigation. His actions, however, speak louder than his words.
24
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Mr. Underwood testified that at the time he
received this contract he was completing two
other jobs, one at C1'earfield and one at Washington
Terrace, and that both of these jobs were substantially compl~ted as of May 10, 1956 (Exhibit 5,
Tr. 59). Mr. Ward knew this; otherwise why was
he so willing and anxious to have all the prior indebtedness of Mr. Underwood cleaned up on May
10, 1956. Any other explanation of the transaction
which took place on or about May 10, 1956 does not
conform with what we know of human behavior.
A creditor does not accept a $11,000 payment on the
one hand and return $7,300 of that payment for
no reason at all, and a person does not generally
pay a creditor $11,000 and then turn around and
borrow $7,300 of it back and agree to pay a $146
service charge without some good reason. What
more logical reason is there than that Mr. Ward
knew that the other jdbs which Mr. Underwood
had been doing were complete and wanted that indebtedness cleared up and Mr. Underwood, of course
anxious to retain the good-will of the Anderson
Lumber Company, was willing to go along with the
proposition.
This is further evidenced by the fact that although no accounting had been opened prior to that
time, Mr. Ward directed that an account be opened
on May 10, 1956 to which the materials for the
25
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school were to be charged and directed that the loan
and service charge be charged to that account. It
is significant also that Mr. Underwood told Mr.
Ward at that time that he did not have sufficient
other moneys available to pay for the labor to be
performed on the school job unless part of the
$11,000 was returned to him; therefore, Mr. Ward
knew on that date that Mr. Underwood did not
have moneys coming from other jobs sufficient to
finance his operation and was entirely dependent
upon whatever advances he might secure under the
contract with Davis County.
The testimony of Myron Berryman indicates
that no other accounts were opened during the period from May 10, 1956 through February 4, 1957
and that all of the materials furnished during that
period fron1 either the Bountiful yard or the Ogden
yard were furnished to the South Davis Junior High
School. Nor does the record disclose that Mr. Underwood was working on any other job during that
period of time, so that the Anderson Lumber Company knew that the only work which Mr. Underwood was doing and for which he, of course, was
receiving payment was the South Davis Junior High
School Job. Nor is there any question as to the source
of the $10,000. Mr. Underwood's financial statement
filed May 10, 1956 only shows a balance of $2,683.10
due from completed contracts and $5,776.28 due
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from the Community Church in Clearfield; whereas
he had coming from Davis County the sum of
$284,310.75 (Defendant's Exhibit 5), ail but $7,500
of which he had drawn at the time the loss was reported to the bonding company on or about February 19, 1957 (Tr. 72), fifteen days after he had
paid off Anderson Lumber Company.
The Anderson Lumber Company denies that it
knew the con tractor was in trouble even though it
did not deliver the last of the millwork to the project
until around December 17, 1956 (Tr. 15), months
after the completion date of September 2, 1956 ( Tr.
5-152), and even though the other creditors of the
contractor began calling the insurance agent of the
Phoenix Insurance Company in January of 1957
(Tr. 117).
It is also interesting to note that even though
this was a demand note due at any time, the payments of $1,000 and $3,000 made on 'September 15,
1956 were applied against the materials and no
part of these payments was applied directly to the
note or service charge.
Another bit of information whi'ch indicates that
Mr. vVard was advised of the true state of facts
and deliberately applied the $7,713.66 to the payment of the note pursuant to an arrangement between him and Mr. Uunderwood that it be so applied,
is that although he claims this was applied to the
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note at the direction of Mr. Underwood both he and
Mr. Underwood testified that this was done in order
to get rid of the interest on the note and Mr. Ward
testified that was his "own individual reasoning
. . . to pay that note off and stop the interest on it
for him, and get it out of the way" (Tr. 24), which
is a direct contradiction of his other testimony that
he played no part in designating the application to
be made of the payments.
Lastly, we have the evidence that the designation placed on the voucher attached to the check paying the $10,000 (Exhibit 6) shows that the designation was written at least at a different time and
the fact that two of the three accounts which Mr.
Underwood paid prior to notifying the bonding company that he was in difficulty was the loan at Anderson Lumber Company and a loan at the Commercial Bank, the only two accounts which would
not have been covered by the bond in this case. It
is admitted that this evidence is circumstantial but
it must be kept in mind that the nature of the case
was such that a'll of the evidence going to the knowledge or intent of Anderson Lumber Company had
to be drawn from witnesses who worked for the
Anderson Lumber Company and J. Loyd Underwood who, himself, was hostile and testified that
i1t was important to him that he maintain his standing with the Anderson Lumber Company (Tr. 89).
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The facts in this case bear a great similarity
to those in the case of United States of America for
the Use of H. H. Carroll v. HenTy C. Beck (U.S.C.A.,
6th Cir., December 6, 1945), 151 Fed. (2d) 964,
166 A.L.R. 637, admittedly decided under the Federal law but which involved the same principles as
enunciated by the Utah court in the cases decided in
this jurisdiction. In that case Beck contracted with
the United States to build 'the Andrew Jackson Housing project at Nashville, Tennessee and furnished a
bond guaranteeing payment of labor and materials.
Beck sub-let the painting jdb to Henry to be done
under the terms of the general contract. Henry in
turn contracted wi:th Carron for supplying him with
paints and sundries needed in the performance of
the contract. In addition Carroll loaned Henry
money for payrolls on the work. Eight estimate
checks issued by Beck payable to the order of Henry
were endorsed by Henry, delivered to and cashed
by Carroll under an agreement between them that
the checks would be credited on the loans made by
Carroll. Beck was not a party to this agreement,
had no knowledge of it and gave no direction for the
applica tion of the payments. Later Carroll advised
Beck that all estimate checks theretofore received
had been applied on his loans to Henry made for the
purpose of maintaining payrolls and insisted the
last or ninth estimate check be similarly applied.
1
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Beck declined, but consented to an agreement whereby one-half of such check would be credited to the
material account and one-half to the loan account
without prejudice to the rights of either party in
respeet to the application of the proceeds of the first
eight estimate checks. The court ruled that the application of these checks by Carroll to his loan account with Henry was prejudicial to Beck and his
surety and that both were entitled to have such payments re-applied upon Carroll's hill for materials.
It was also concluded that the money loaned by
Carroll to Henry was not covered by the bond, that
Carroll was a mere volunteer lender to Henry and
that even though the borrowed money was used
for Henry's payrolls and Beck knew it Carroll was
not within the protection of the bond for the amount
of the loan. The Circuit Court sustained this holding and said.
"It is no doubt the general rule that
where a de'btor owes more than one matured
contractual duty to the same person, and these
duties will have performance of identical
character, the debtor may have his payments
applied to any one of his matured obligations
as he sees fit. Restatement, Contracts, § 387.
But there is a limitation upon the debtor's
power to control application, and if he is under
a duty to a third person to devote the money
to the discharge of a particular debt, and the
creditor knows or has reason to know of such
duty, then the payment must be so applied.
30
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Restatement, Contracts, § 388. But it is said
that in order to bring a contractual duty within the rule of the above section, it is essential
that the delJtor shall be under a contract with
the thil·cl person, not merely to pay a particular debt but devote to that debt the very money
with which payment vvas made. Comment (a)
§ 388. The federal cases, however, generally
deny the debtor's power to control application,
insofar as the interests of others are affected,
when the creditor knows where the money
comes from. 'This is sometimes grounded upon
abstract considerations of equity and justice,
and sometimes upon an implied contractual
obligation to the surety and his principal, in
cases bearing similarity to this. R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., supra;
Town of River Junction v. Maryland Casualty Co., 5 Cir. 110 F 2d 278, 281, 134 ALR
727; Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 9 Cir.
227 F 780; United States v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, 4 Cir., 67 F 2d 121, 122. As
rationalized in R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v.
Electrioal Supply Co., supra ( 112 F 2d 153),
to allow a creditor to collect an old debt out
of the monies paid upon a contract, and to
leave the charges for material furnished, outstanding, is 'to the prejudice of the principal
and the surety on the 'bond, and of other beneficiaries of the bond, and if sanctioned might
cause great injustice.' An earlier decision of
the same court, To~vn of River Junction v.
Maryland Casualty Co., supra, was based upon an implied obligation of the contractor not
to divert money from the job. Such an obligation was enforced by a reapplication of
payments in the Columbia Digger Co. and
Johnson, Smathers & Rollins cases, supra.
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Delaware Dredging Co. v. Tucker Stevedoring Co. 3 Cir. 25 F 2nd 44, is apparently to
the contrary, but as pointed out in the Farnsworth case, no question was there ra'ised as
to whether or not the source of the money was
known to the reci pien t.
"It is contended, however, that in the
cited cases the assailed applications were made
on pre-existing delJts which did not have
their source in the work from which the funds
used for payment were derived, while here
not only the materials furnished by Carroll,
but the money loaned by him, were both used
in the performance of Henry's contract with
Beck, and there was but one matured obligition, namely, Henry's money debt to Carroll. We fail to see how these circumstances
provide a logical basis for differentiating in
the application of the principle determinative
of the adjudicated cases. The logic that assigns priority to an older debt when no considerations of justice or implied obligation
forbid, would seem to make the doctrine there
applied even more persuasive in cases involving concurrent dbligations. In any event, it is
the deHtor here who has made the segregation
of the two debts by his agreement to apply his
payments to the one and not to the other, and
it is fair inference that if the time element
is 'important, the loans in substantial part,
preceded the furnishing of rna terials. ·
''We think it entirely irnrna terial that the
money borrowed by Henry was devoted to the
payment of labor on the job, for even if Carroll had paid for labor directly instead of
loaning money to Henry for that purpose, he
would have been in no better position with
respect to the funds provided by Beck in sat32
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isfaction of Henry's claim for work under
the subcontract, for the rule is clear that one
who loans money to a contractor, even if it
be for the payment of laborers and material
men, is a mere volunteer, is not subrogated
to the rights of laborers or material men, and
acquires no lien thereby. Farmers' Bank v.
Hayes, 6 Cir, 58 F 2d 34, 3'7; Prairie State
Nat. Bank v. United States, 164 US 227, 17
S Ct. 142, 41 Led 412.
"It is urged that the cases recognizing
an exception to the general rule, all hold that
the party who receives the money and applies
the same to the prejudice of the surety, must
have known the source of the money. Here
it is said, the facts clearly establish that
Carroll knew that the money paid by Henry
came from Beck but do not show that any part
of it came from the United States. If it came
from independent funds of the general contractor and not from payments arising out
of the contract, the surety had no interest
in it to be protected. It is fair inference, however, that the money used by Beck to pay
Henry came from the United States, and that
such inference was drawn by the court is 'implicit in the findings and conclusions of the
Master adopted by the court. The con tract
between Beck and the United States is not
in the record, but it is recited in the complaint filed on 'behalf of Henry that final
settlement under the contract was made as
shown by the certificate of the Assistant
Comptroller General of the United States, and
it must be assumed, therefore, that other
settlements had been made from time to time
by similar certificates.
"Finally, it is contended that even though
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there may be question about the liability of
the surety for the materia1 bill because repayment of the loan was not within the coverage of the bond, there can be no question about
the liability of Beck. Henry, however, was a
suhcon tractor, and his subcontract was subject to the terms of Beck's con tract with the
government. By that contract Beck undertook
promptly to pay all claims for labor and materials and to protect the government from
liens. Henry knew the extent of Beck's obligation to the United States, and contracted
with Beck in subordination to it. Carroll must
likewise be charged with knowledge of the
obligations of both. Henry's contract on a
government project was the basis for the
credit extended to him by Carroll. If equitable considerations or the doctrine of an implied obligation arising out of these circumstances relieves the surety from the obligation
to Carroll on its bond, it must likewise relieve Beck from obligation for money loaned
to Henry. Any other conclusion would require that Beck, having paid Henry for work
and materials, must again pay Carroll for
materials furnished in order to fully perform
his agreement with the government. Neither
justice nor reason requires such result, and
the adjudicated federal cases are persuasive
precedents against it." 166 A.L.R. 637.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE
IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND ARE BEYOND THE IS'SUES DETERMINED BY THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.

In its Findings Of Fact enumerated 11 through
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15, which appear on pages 82 and 83 of the Record,
the court merely reiterates the findings of the jury,
and in Finding Of Fact No. 16 the court adopts
the jury's finding as its own. If the court erred
in failing to direct the jury to allow the defendant
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut a set-off as outlined in the argument hereinbefore set out then these findings must necessarily
fail and we will not undertake in this section to reiterate the reasons why we believe them to be in
error.
We wish at this time to invite the court's attention to the Findings enumerated 7, 8, and 9.
Finding Of Fact No. 7 reads as follows:
"That on or about May 10, 1956, J. Loyd
Underwood was indebted to Anderson Lumber Company in the amount of approximately
$11,485.20 for materials furnished to the addition to the South Davis Junior High School
as well as other bonded jobs; that on or about
May 8, 1956, J. Loyd Underwood paid Anderson Lumber Company $11,790.51 on his
account; that on or about May lOth Anderson
Lumber Company made a construction loan
to J. Loyd Underwood in the amount of
$7300.00, as evidenced by Underwood's promissory note, to be used and which was used
as working capital for the South Davis Junior
High School Addition."
This Finding, prepared by the attorney for Anderson Lumber Company and adopted by the court,
illustrates the manner in which the court and the
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jury (as will be pointed out in a subsequent section
of this appeal) were led into error and contains the
nub of the defense which the Anderson Lumber
Company raised to the defendant's claim. The plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, until the trial of
this action never claimed to have furnished J. Loyd
Underwood any materials prior to May 10, 1956
(see Defendant's Exhibit 2). The court in its memorandum decision made at the time of the pre-trial
dis-allowed certain of the items on said Exhibit
and allowed others and arrived at the conclusion
that the Anderson Lumber Company had supplied
materials to the South Davis Junior High School
in the amount of $12,083.57 and that the Phoenix
Insurance Company was liable to Anderson Lumber
Company in the amount of $11,320.16, reserving
the issue of whether or not the $7,713.66 paid to
J. Loyd Underwood on February 4, 1957 should be
off-set against the amount due Anderson Lumber
Company from the defendant insurance company
(see the court's Decree on pages 85 and 86 of the
Record). The Finding that J. Loyd Underwood was
indebted to Anderson Lumber Company in the
amount of approximately $11,485.20 for materials
furnished to the addition to the South Davis Junior
High School as well as other bonded jobs is beyond
the issues prescribed by the pre-trial order. Were
this the only objection to the Finding it would prob36
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ably not be prejudicial to the defendant Phoenix
Insurance Company.
Since it is included in the Findings we must
conclude that the court based its decision disallowing
the set-off in part on the fact that the $7,713.66
had been used in part to pay the Anderson Lumber
Company for materials which the bonding company
would have been responsible for had the Anderson
Lumber Company not loaned the money to J. Loyd
Underwood. The same thing may be said of the
finding that the $11,485.20 was paid for materials
furnished under "other bonded jobs". Again this
is beyond the issues as determined by the pre-trial
order and might not be prejudicial except when read
in connection with the testimony set out herein relative to the fact that the Phoenix Insurance Company
of Hartford, Connecticut may have furnished bonds
for other jobs which the defendant J. Loyd Underwood undertook prior to the con tract with which
we are concerned in this case it leads us to the conclusion that the court adopted the plaintiff's theory
that it made no difference whether the $7,713.66
was wrongfully applied in this case to pre-existing
indebtedness since the bonding company would probably be lia:ble under some other bond for this indebtedness in any event.
The finding that the "construction loan to J.
Loyd Underwood in the amount of $7300.00, as
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evidenced by Underwood's promissory note, to be
used and which was used as working capital for
the South Davis Junior High School Auditorium"
is again completely outside of the issues of the case
as illustrated by the Utah case of Salt Lake City
v. O'Conner, cited above, and the Federal case of
United States Of America for the Use of H. H.
Carroll v. Henry C. Beck, supra, both of which have
held that a creditor cannot recover for a loan made
to the contractor even if it be for payment of labor
and materials. The finding illustrates again that the
court adopted the plaintiff's theory that it made no
difference if the plaintiff applied the payment of
February 4, 1957 to a loan made by the plaintiff
to J. Loyd Underwood since this money was used
for the payment of labor and materials for which
the surety company would have been liable had they
not been paid.
The court finds in its Finding Of Fact No. 8
"'That J. Loyd Underwood deposited all
of the payments he received from his construction jobs in one bank account and that he paid
all his personal and business obligations by
checks drawn on this one bank account." (R.
82)

This is obviously in error. There is testimony
in the record that Mr. Underwood only had one bank
account ( Tr. 80) but there is no testimony in the
record that all of the payments made by J. Loyd
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Underwood to the Anderson Lumber Company were
made by checks drawn on Mr. Underwood's account.
In fact, since Mr. Underwood on May 10, 1956
turned two checks, one for $4,500 and one for
$7,290.51, over to the Anderson Lumber Company
(Tr. 18), which over-paid his account by $305.31
(Defendant's Exhibit 3), the logical inference is
that he must have endorsed checks over to Anderson
Lumber Company which were furnished to him.
Had he drawn a check on his own account it would
appear logical for him to have drawn the check in
the exact amount of his account, which at that time
was $11,485.20 (Defendant's Exhibi't 3). The finding is obviously intended to infer that J. Loyd Underwood so comingled his accounts that the Anderson Lumber Company could not identify the source
of the payments which it received, and to the extent
that the court based its decision thereon the decision of the court is in error.
In Finding Of Fact No. 9 the court found:
"That on or about February 4, 1957, J.
Loyd Underwood paid to Anderson Lumber
Company $10,000.00 which was, pursuant to
his written direction, applied by Anderson
Lumber Company first to pay the balance due
on the aforesaid promissory note and second,
the balance to J. Loyd Underwood's open account." (R. 82)
This finding is clearly erroneous in one respect
and 'it is not supported by the evidence in one other
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respect. The testimony of the accountant, Myron
Berryman, which appears on pages 40 to 48 of the
transcript, as substantiated by the testimony of
Darrold Crawford which appears on pages 9·3 to
110 of the transcript, is to the effect that the open
account was closed out by the payment of $827.81
on September 15, 1956 ( Tr. 44) so that the only
account which J. Loyd Underwood had on February
4, 1957 was an account specifically labeled South
Davis Junior High ('Tr. 42). This again is a rather
obvious attempt to cover up the plaintiff's knowledge
of where the funds came from and where they should
be applied.
As to whether or not the $10,000 was applied
to this account upon the direction of J. Loyd Underwood or upon the direction of Mr. Ward, there is
a confl'ict in the testimony. J. Loyd Underwood did
testify that he designated the place where the money
should be applied but Mr. Ward, in contradiction
to this, testified that it was his "own individual
reasoning . . . to pay that note off and stop the
interest on it for him, and ge't it out of the way"
( Tr. 24). This being an admission of the plaintiff's
own employee and officer, it is believed his admission
should control and, therefore, that the finding that
the payment was applied at the direction of J.
Loyd Underwood is erroneous.
Thus it is seen that the judgment in this case
40
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is based on findings which are not supported by
the evidence but are contrary to the evidence, upon
findings which were outside of the issues as prescribed by the pre-trial order and upon conclusions
which were not pertinent to the case and which
should not have been considered by the court in arriving at its decision.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY OR ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY AND THE SPECIAL VERDICT SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WAS SO RESTRICTIVE AS
TO NOT ADEQUATELY COVER THE ISSUES IN THE
CASE.

There is a danger in special verdicts or special
interrogatories which may appear somewhat illussory but which 'is nevertheless very real, especially
when we are concerned with the conduct of individuals. That danger is that when we consider a
person's conduct piece-meal, that is to say act by
act, it may be that no individual act by itself would
appear improper or unlawful but when all of the
facts are considered together the sum total of all
the acts may add up to improper or unlawful conduct. To illustrate, let us assume a case in which
a man was driving just a little bit too fast, was not
keeping quite as good a lookout as he should have
been keeping and who had consumed enough liquor
to impair his driving ability just a bit. A jury, looking at each individual act, that is whether the man
41
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was negligent in driving too fast, whether he was
keeping a proper lookout and whether he was negligent in driving under the influence of alcohol, might
very well decide that he was not negligent in each
of these instances; whereas the same jury, if they
considered all of the acts together, might conclude
that the person was guilty of negtigence. Special
interrogatories should, therefore, be broad enough
to permit juries to view the whole conduct of the
parties.
In using other language, 53 Am. Jur. 743 says
it this way:
"Questions to the jury should relate to
the ultimate facts, and no't merely to the evidence on which such ultimate facts rest. 'The
purpose of having the jury find specially on
a particular question is to ascertain the fact
itself, and not merely 'the evidence which may
tend to prove it, hence, parties to an action
have no right, under the guise of submitting
questions of fact to be found specially by the
jury, to require them to give their views on
each item of evidence, thus practically subjecting them to a cross-examination as to the
entire case.''
In 89 C.J.S. 248 it is said:
" ... A special issue or interrogatory is
improper and may be refused where it does
not call for the determination of some ultimate fact, as where it relates to subordinate
facts to be considered in deciding ·ultimate
facts, and necessarily embraced in the finding
of, and merely incidental to, the ultimate
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issue, or where it is designed merely to recapitulate the evidence rather than to determine the facts proved by the evidence."
The theory under which the Phoenix Insurance
Company of Hartford, Connecticut sought to require
the application of the $7,713.66 to the payment of
labor and materials is set out in its Amendment To
Answer and Cross Complaint on pages 16 and 17 of
the Record and was in substance that the plaintiff,
Anderson Lumber Company, unlawfully and wrongfully applied the $7,713.66 to a note of J. Loyd Underwood to Anderson Lumber Company, wh'ich note
was given in payment of pre-existing indebtednesses,
and that the Anderson Lumber Company knew or
shourd have known that the defendant J. Loyd Underwood was insolvent and that the moneys paid
to it on February 6, 1957 (the evidence showed this
date to be February 4, 1957) were moneys received
from the Davis County Board of Education for the
construction of the addition to the South Davis
Junior High School, and further that the defendant
J. Loyd Underwood and the plaintiff, Anderson
Lumber Company, have wrongfully and unlawfully
conspired to defraud the Davis Coun'ty Board of
Education and the defendant Phoenix Insurance
Company of Hartford, Connecticut of the sum of
$7,713.66 by using moneys which should have been
used for the payment of materials and labor for
other purposes. The trial court submitted the case
43
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to the jury on five interrogatories which are summarized as follows :

1. Did they find that the money paid
by Mr. Underwood on February 4, 1957 was
received for work done on the addition to the
South Davis Junior High School?
2. If the moneys came from such work,
was that source known to the Anderson Lumber Company?
3. Did Mr. Underwood direct that the
payment of February 4, 1957 be applied first
to the note and then to his material account?
4. Was that transaction referred to as
a loan of $7,300 motivated, insofar as Anderson Lumber Company is concerned, 'by a desire to cause a debt for materials delivered to
various jobs to appear to be paid; and did
it further appear that the only remaining
obligation was a good faith loan to Mr. Underwood for capital to be used in the work
at the South Davis Junior High School so
that it might later be maneuvered that the
bond on the South Davis Junior High School
contract would insure against any loss on the
Underwood account and that but for the above
alleged 1notive no such loan transaction would
have taken place?
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5. Did they find it proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the event referred
to as a loan was in fact not a real loan but a
mere bookkeeping method of fixing an amount
owed on an account and so intended by Anderson Lumber Company at the time but l'ater
on, when !t received a $10,000 check from Mr.
Underwood, the Anderson Lumber Company
decided to assert the sham loan was a bona
fide loan so that the money paid to Mr. Underwood could be app'lied without an admission that it was applying part of this $10,000
to an account for ma'teria:ls delivered to other
buildings than the South Davis Junior High
School?
It is admitted that all of these have some bearing on whether or not J. Loyd Underwood and the
Anderson Lumber Company undertook to defraud
Davis County and 'the Phoenix Insurance Company
of Hartford, Connecticut of moneys which should
have been applied to the payment of material and
labor. It is submitted, however, that these are merely the evidentiary facts from which the general conclusion could be drawn. When we keep in mind the
problem of burden of proof the jury, in weighing
all the evidentiary facts going 'to this issue and not
limifi.ng their deliberations to the evidentiary facts
outlined in the special interrogatories, may have
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determined the ultimate fact in favor of the defendant even though they were not convinced that the
defendant met its burden of proof in connection with
each individual evidentiary fact submitted to them
in 'the interrogatories. By its Requested Interrogatory No.7, which was admittedly not too well drawn,
the defendant Phoenix Insurance Company undertook to get at this broad genera] issue. This was
denied by the court and no interrogatory undertaking to get at the ultimate issue of whether or not
the plain tiff and J. Loyd Underwood were undertaking to defraud Davis County and the bonding
company was given.
Again, the defendant undertook by its Requested Instructions to have the court instruct the jury
on the ultimate question of whether or not the Anderson Lumber Company and J. Loyd Underwood
had undertaken to defraud Davis County and the
bonding company of moneys which should have been
applied to the payment of materials and supplies
(see Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 4 and
8), but these instructions were denied.
This court has held that a party has a right
to have his theory of the case submitted to a jury
if the evidence would justify reasonable men in
fo'llowing the theory, and in reviewing the evidence
as to whether certain instructions should be given
it is the trial court's duty and the duty of the re46
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viewing court on appeal to consider the evidence
most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. See Rcckstrorn v. Williams, 282 Pac. (2d) 309,
3 Utah (2d) 210. It is submitted that in this case
the evidence supported an over-all inquiry 'into the
question of whether or not the Anderson Lumber
Company and J. Loyd Underwood had undertaken
to defraud Davis County and this defendant in that
the special verdict and the court's !instructions were
so 1·estr'ictive as not to cover 'this issue.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON 'THE GROUND SET
OUT IN POINTS I THROUGH III, AND UPON THE
FURTHER GROUND THAT THE COURT ERREU IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL,
IRRELEVANT AND OUTSIDE THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AND PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS GUILTY OF
MISCONDUCT IN ARGUING THIS EVIDENCE IN THE
CLOSING ARGUMENT.

·Throughout this trial the attorney for the
plaintiff sought to implant in the minds of the court
and the jury that it made no difference whether or
not the $7,713.66 had been wrongfully applied to the
note of J. Loyd Underwood wi'th the Anderson Lumber Company for three reasons: First, that if the
money was used to pay pre-existing !indebtedness that
indebtedness was made up in part of materials which
had been furnished for the construction of the addition to the South Davis Junior High School; second
47
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that the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford,
Connecticut may have carried other bonds on previous jobs done by J. Loyd Underwood and that it
would have had to pay the pre-existing indebtedness
anyway; and third that the moneys loaned to J.
Loyd Underwood were actually used in the construction of the addition to the South Davis Junior High
School anyway.
On pages 11 to 16 of this brief we have set out
the evidence objected to. Part of the evidence was
admitted under a theory that it went to what motivation the Anderson Lumber Company may have
had. That such was not the intent of plaintiff's
counsel becomes apparent when we read his argument which appears on pages 157 through 176 of
the transcript. On page 159 of the transcript he
argues:
"So that the account was due Anderson
Lumber Company as of May 10, 1956 consisted
in part of the materials which had been supplied to the South Davis School and to J. Loyd
Underwood prior to that time. There is no
question about that, and there is no dispute
in this evidence on it, but in addition that
$11,000, the porfion of it which related to
the materials supplied to the South Davis
High School, you remember that Loyd Underwood also said that that account also consisted of a church job which he had. He had two
other jobs. There was the church job that he
testified to, and there was the job at Clearfield, so that these three accounts, number
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one was the church job, we'll label it. The
number two was a construction job out in
Clearfield, and number three was the South
Davis High School.
"Materials were going into those three
jobs and that made up th'is account in the
sum of $11,000 as it existed on May 10, 1956.
Now, that is the testimony of Mr. Underwood,
and he is the fellow that knows."
On page 160 of the transcript plaintiff's counsel argued:
"Now, the important thing that I want
you to bear in mind, and if I can't get this
poin't over I feel that my lawsuit is in jeopardy, but the important thing 'is that each
one of these jobs was bonded. Each one of
them; Loyd Underwood testified yesterday
that they were bonded. He wasn't quite sure
whether the church and the job at Clearfield
were bonded with the Phoenix Insurance Company. There is no question that the South
Davis job was, and there is no question that
one of these other two was bonded with Phoenix, but the main pdin't is that each one of
them was a bonded job, and that is the substance of the testimony from Mr. Underwood
as it existed on May 10.
"Now, when Mr. Hanson tatks to you
about this account be'ing unsecured, that is
just a bunch of belly-wash. We had more security on this, or as much security on this
as we have on this account with him right
now. If he couldn't pay that $11,000, if Phoenix can't pay tha't, we had no security on the
$11,000 but if Phoenix Insurance Company
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of Hartford, Connecticut is solvent, and I
assume that national company is, we had as
much security on that $11,000 as we could
have, ladies and gentlemen.''
Beginning on page 162 of the transcript he
argues:
"It is tough for me to believe that.
Now, here is one other thing that I think is
very important at this state. This $7300 that
Loyd Underwood obtained from us according
to his own testimony went into that job.
"It went into that job to pay labor and
materialmen and was used as working capital.
Now, what is the effect of that on th'is bonding company? It is perfectly obvious that by
Loyd Underwood paying $7300 . . .
"MR. HANSON: (Interposing) I object
to that on the ground it is again beyond the
scope of the evidence in this case. He admits
that the construction loan is not covered.
"THE COURT: He may argue that.
"MR. ALLEN: Will you admit, Mr. Hanson, that the construction loan is not covered
by the bond?
"MR. HANSON: The only objection I
have to it is that you go in to a lot of things
not covered by the evidence.
"THE COURT: You may continue your
argument.
"MR. ALLEN: Now, the $7300 used by
Loyd Underwood on that job, the effect of it
was to reduce their obligation. When Loyd
Underwood used that money to pay for rna50
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terials that went into that job and to pay
labor that went into that jdb that worked on
that job, that $7300 payment decreased the
obligation of the Phoenix Insurance Company.
So when he says he is going to be compelled
to pay something that he isn't obligated to
pay as a matter of equity if we are deprived
of that $7300, ladies and gentlemen, he gets
the benefit indirectly that he wasn't entitled
to get.
"THE COURT: Just a minute. The argument you are making at this time is improper. It is not going 'to the modus of the
people. The jury is reminded that under no
circumstances could the personal loan be collected from the Phoenix Insurance Company
in this case.''
On page 17 4 of the transcript plaintiff's attorney said:
"In other words, that it was a bona fide
transaction that Loyd Underwood needed the
money and that we did not improve our position. We jeopardized it. Now, that is what
happened on May 10, 1956. We took that
$7300 out of secured accounts, out of an account secured by this same bonding company
and put it into an unsecured position."
There is no evidence in the record that the
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut furnished a bond for any other job which J.
Loyd Underwood may have had. There is a general
statement by J. Loyd Underwood that the other jobs
were bonded, but that he would have to check his
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records to determine the name of the bonding company. And in answer to the specific question if the
previous accounts were covered by a bond with the
named insurance company Mr. Underwood answered: "That I don't know." (Tr. 77)
The test~imony that part of the prior existing
indebtedness was for materiaTs furnished for the
construction of the addition to the South Davis Junior High School was outside the issues defined in
the pre-trial order as previously pointed ou't and
'the evidence as to what use was made of the purported construction loan to J. Loyd Underwood was
immaterial. All of this evidence was objected to by
couns~l for the defendant and an examination of
the plaintiff's argument will disclose that timely objections were made to the argument by defendant's
counsel. This evidence should have been excluded by
the court, and even were we to admit that it was
admissible for the purpose of showing motivation
it could not be argued in the general way argued by
plain tiff's counsel.
". . . Neither can counsel in arguing a
case to the jury make use of evidence admitted for a specific purpose only, and explicitly
limited by the court for such purpose as if
it were general evidence for a11 purposes; he
cannot use evidence admitted for such specific purpose for other purposes for wh'ich it
would have been inadmissable, or argue that
such evidence should have been admitted with52
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out qualification and was competent for all
purposes. Comment by counsel on evidence
excluded by the trial court is prima facie prejudicial and may be sufficient to cause a reviewing court to reverse the judgment, particularly when counsel persist in such comment
notwithstanding admonitions by the court to
confine his remarks to the testimony actually
given. A new trial may be granted in extreme
cases even though the 'trial court, upon the
objection of the counsel for the opposite party,
restrained counsel from continuing the improper remarks. As a general rule, however,
impropriety on the part of counsel in argument in alluding to testimony excluded by the
court will not warrant a reversal where it is
corrected by the action of the court or of counsel himself." 53 Am. Jur. 389.
It should be apparent that 'this evidence was
highly prejudicial to the defendant. What more appealing argument could be made to laymen not
schooled in the law, or for that matter to a court,
than the argument that the defendant, an insurance
company, was attempting to avoid an obligation
that it would otherwise have been obl'igated to pay
anyway. The fallacy and, of course, the prejudicial
part of the argument is "that the insurance company would have dtherwise been obligated to pay
the obligations anyway."
During the course of the trial the defendant's
counsel had moved the court that it find as a matter
of law that the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hart53

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ford, Connecticut was entitled to an off-set of
$7,713.66 and at the conclusion of the trial, by a motion found on pages 75 and 76 of the Record, counsel
again moved the court 'that it allow the set-off of
$7,713.66 or in the alternative that it grant a new
trial upon the ground that the answers to the interrogatories are contrary to the unaisputed evidence,
that the court had committed errors in law in instructing the jury and upon the further ground
that plaintiff's counsel had been guilty of misconduct "in arguing m·atters in his closing argument
which were not included within the evidence submitted in the trial, were beyond the scope of the issues
involved in the trial, and were intended to inflame
or prejudice the jury against the defendant Phoenix
Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut." This
motion was denied by the court, erroneously, we believe, as we have attempted to point out in the foregoing argument.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMpANY AND AGAINST J. LOYD UNDERWOOD IN THE
AMOUN'T OF $12,083.57.

By its Answer and Cross Complaint filed herein the defendant Phoenix Insurance Company of
Hartford, Connecticut cross claimed over against
the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, that a judgment be entered in its favor and against the defen54
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dant J. Loyd Underwood for the amount of the
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff herein.
The court in its Decree found that the Anderson
Lumber Company was entitled to a judgment
against Phoenix Insurance Company in the amount
of $11,320.16 plus interest a't the rate of six percent
from April 8, 1957 together with $50.00 attorney
fees and its costs incurred herein ( R. 86) . It further found that the Phoenix Insurance Company was
entitled to judgment against J. Loyd Underwood
in the amount of $12,083.57, the amount which the
court had previously found that J. Loyd Underwood
was indebted to the Anderson Lumber Company. It
is submitted that the judgment of Phoenix Insurance Company against J. Loyd Underwood should
be in the same amount as the judgment of Anderson
Lumber Company against the Phoenix Insurance
Company, that is for whatever amount this court
on this appeaLor the District Court upon remittitur
of this case to the District Court should find that
judgment should be. It is believed that counsel for
the plaintiff will concede this point. In fact, we are
informed, although it does not appear in the Record,
that this has already been done by a nunc pro tunc
order of the District Court. We mention the matter
only to fully inform this court and to keep the record straight.
It should further be pointed out to the court
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that the defendant and appellant, by paragraph 9
of its Statement Of Points filed herein (R. 91),
has conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum of $3,671.81 plus interest on this
sum from April 8, 1957 at the rate of six percent
plus $50.00 attorney fees and the costs assessed by
the court and is directing this appeal only to the
failure of the trial court to allow a set-off for
$'7,713.66 or to properly instruct the jury on the issues pertaining to said set-off or to grant a new
trial on this issue.
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note that at the time J.
Loyd Underwood first undertook the construction
of the addition to the South Davis Junior High
School on or about October 31, 1955 he was indebted
to the Anderson Lumber Company for materials
and supplies furnished to other jobs in the sum of
$7,000.00 which corresponds roughly to the
$7,713.66 which it is attempting now to apply to its
so-called construction loan. During the course of
the contract, including the loan, millwork, rental of
equipment, materials and supplies, interest in miscellaneous items, it charged to the account identified
as the addition to the South Davis Junior High
School the sum of $23,974.06 (Tr. 45) and received
from J. Loyd Underwood a total of at least
$25,790.51 ( T1·. 45) The evidence indicates that it
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has applied part of this money to pre-existing indebtedness of Mr. Underwood and we know that on May
10, 1956 it received the sum of $11,790.51 (Tr. 18)
paying up all of Mr. Underwood's prior indebtedness and leaving him with a credit balance of
$305.31 (Tr. 48 and 101).
The appellant herein, Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, is making no objection to the application of that payment, nor is it
objecting to the fact that on or a:bout the same date
Anderson Lumber Company returned $7,300 of this
amount to Mr. Underwood for use on the school
project and charged this loan with a service charge
and the subsequent interest earned by the loan to
this account. Nor is it contended that at the time
that this payment was received and th'is so-called
loan was made that the Anderson Lumber Company
knew that Mr. Underwood would subsequently default in the performance of his contract and fail
to pay for materials furnished by the Anderson
Lumber Company or the other suppliers. However,
it is claimed that on February 4, 1957 when Mr.
Underwood was in serious financial difficulty this
so-called construction loan was used as a device by
Mr. Ward of the Anderson Lumber Company and
Mr. Underwood by which they seek to have $7, 713.6'6
of a $10,000 payment made by Mr. Underwood on
February 4, 1957 applied to the payment of this
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so-called construction loan so that it might in turn
recover this amount from the bonding company
which furnished Mr. Underwood's performance bond
under the guise of recovering for materials and
supplies furnished to the construction project.
The authorities hold that if at the time it received this $10,000 payment the Anderson Lumber
Company knew, or had reason to know, of Mr. Underwood's obligation to apply this payment to the
discharge of his obligations for materials and supplies it was dbligated to so apply the payment regardless of any designation made either by the
company or by Mr. Underwood. The Anderson Lumber Company denies that it knew or had reason to
know of Mr. Underwood's obligation to so apply
these funds, but all of the evidence indicates, as
strongly as evidence can indicate where it must by
reason of the nature of the case he drawn from adverse witnesses who are the only persons who are
actually able to say what they knew at the time,
that the Anderson Lumber Company through its
representative Mr. Ward knew the source of the
moneys which Mr. Underwood turned over to it on
February 4, 1957, knew of his obligation to apply
this money on materials and supplies furn'ished to
the addition to the South Davis Junior High School
and that it and Mr. Underwood sought_ to apply
this money to the payment of the so-called construe58
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tion loan knowing that were it successful in this
regard the balance of the moneys owed by Mr. Underwood could be recovered from the bonding company, the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford,
Connecticut, defendant and appellant herein.
The Anderson Lumber Company, of course, denies this knowledge but the evidence shows that it
had been acquainted with Mr. Underwood for six
years prior to his undertaking this job, tha:t it knew
the details of the construction contract and were
instrumental in helping Mr. Underwood secure a
bond, assuring the bonding company that advances
received under the contract would be applied on its
account for materials and sup p 1 'i e s furnished.
Through Mr. Ward it knew Mr. Underwood had only
had two other small construction projects which
were in the process of completion on October 31,
1955 and substantially completed on May 10, 1956,
at which time it required that he pay for the materials furnished to these jobs even though it had
to in effect loan him part of the money from which
he made this payment. On February 4, 1957 when
Mr. Underwood paid the $10,000 payment involved
here'in he was five months behind in the performance
of his contract with the Davis County School Board
and the other contractors were already contracting
the agent of the bonding company in respect to their
accounts. The Anderson Lumber Company would
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have us believe that it was not aware of this situation even though it did not finish installing the millwork under its contract until December 17, 1956,
over three months after the en tire contract was to
have been completed. It would have us believe that
on February 4, 1957 Mr. Underwood mailed it the
$10,000 check and told it to apply the money to the
so-called construction loan even though its own agent,
Mr. Ward, testifies this was applied on his own
individual reasoning with the intent of cutting off
the interest on the note.
Mr. Underwood was, of course, naturally interested in seeing the Anderson Lumber Company
come out whole and of the three accounts which he
paid prior to notifying the bonding company on or
about February 19, 1957 of his difficulty two, including the Anderson Lumber Company, were for
loans which would not have been covered under the
bond.
Nor is there any question as to the source of
this money. The contract with the Davis County
School Board was for $400,000.00. On May 10, 1956
Mr. Underwood, even though he had drawn
$70,517.08 from the Davis County School Board (Tr.
18, did not have sufficient moneys to pay the
$11,485.20 to the Anderson Lumber Company without being first assured that it would loan him $7,300
of this sum back and even at that time did not have
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$10,000 owed to him on uncompleted contracts.
The Anderson Lumber Company undertook to
defend this action on a theory having a very good
emotional appeal to the judge and jury but on one
not founded in the law. It said in effect that the
bonding company should be required to pay the
$7,713.66 for the reason that part of the materials
furnished prior to May 10, 1956 may have gone into
the Davis County School project anyway so that
the bonding company was merely paying for something that i't woul'd have had to pay for anyway.
Along this same line it was successful in getting
evidence into the record that th'is particular bonding
company may have furnished other bonds to the defendant J. Loyd Underwood wHich 'the Anderson
Lumber Company might have been able to recover
under had it not elected to charge the so-called construction loan to this account, and said further that
the so-called construction loan was used by J. Loyd
Underwood to pay for materials and supplies and
that had he not secured it from the Anderson Lumber Company he would merely be indebted that much
more for materials and supplies which the bonding
company would have to pay.
The trial court went a:long wfth the plain tiff
on this theory as evidenced by its allowing intraduction of evidence pertaining to this theory which
was wholly immaterial and irrelevant and as evi61
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denced further by its Findings of Fact and Conclus'inons of Law which incorporate this evidence.
The defendant Phoenix Insurance Company believed
this course of conduct on the part of J. Loyd Underwood and the Anderson Lumber Company to be a
fraud upon it and the Davis County Board of Education and by its Requested Interrogatories and Instructions sought to present that ~ssue to the jury.
The trial court denied the defen'dant its right to have
the jury pass upon its theory and chose only to submit to them interrogatories going to isolated evidentiary facts which were only a part of the ultimate
conclusion as to whether or not J. Loyd Underwood
and Anderson Lumber Company had undertaken to
defraud the Davis County Board of Education and
the Phoenix Insurance Company.
Plaintiff's counsel very adroitly under the guise
of speaking to matters which might have a beating
on the motiva·fion of Anderson Lumber Company and
over the objection of opposing counsel, and even
after having been told by the trial court at one time
to desist, framed an argument based on the immaterial and irrelevant evidence he had been able to
inject into the Record; and after having so done
there appeared to be no question that a jury, not
being versed in the requirments of the law, would
answer the interrogatories in a manner which would
permit a decision for the plaintiff. The defendant
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and appellant herein has, by a motion directed to
the court's power to set aside the verdict and allow
the set-off as a matter of law or to grant a new trial
on this issue, given the trial court the opportunity
to correct the errors it committed and to enter a
judgment according to the law and the evidence
herein. The trial court has chosen not to do so.
It is submitted that justice and equity in this
case require that this court allow the set-off of
$7, 713.66, but if the court should not be convinced
by the evidence then it is submitted that the court
should grant to the defendant Phoenix Insurance
Company of Hartford, Connecticut a new t:rial on
the issue of whether or not this set-off should be
allowed so that a jury might be allowed to pass on
the ultimate issue at hand without having before
it matters outside the issues involved which arehighly prejudicial to the defendant and appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
CANNON AND HANSON
Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant
623 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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